It appears that the Iraqi Army is going to retake Mosul. It has been slow going, and they have had to use the US and other Air Forces (plus some ..um, irregulars) to finish the job.  How, after so many years of training and arming the Iraqi Army, did this state of affairs come to pass?

First, a little background. The Iraqi Army at the beginning of 1979 was of respectable size, and it was fully equipped with Soviet export-grade equipment. Its doctrine and training were the usual crude aping of Soviet doctrine. Heavy reliance on numbers and artillery with tanks. Not very flexible and individual initiative was all but non-existent. The Iraqi Air Force was similarly Soviet armed and organized. The 8 year war with Iran 1980-1988 degraded this force significantly.

Then the Iraqis really got their arses kicked. An exhausted and broken army faced the peak Cold War ready forces of the US, UK, France, and others. The results, in retrospect, were what should have been expected (I chuckle remembering Edward Luttwak and other “experts” warning that the “battle hardened” Iraqi Army would be a tough fight). Cut to a dozen years later, and they were in even worse shape – while their enemies were fielding even more advanced forces. What was left of the Iraqi Army was clubbed down, faded away, and the country was occupied in 2003. Long story short – this was not a history of success, no tradition of excellence, or a force that could adapt, change, and improve. So that was the situation when we decided to put a hand to it (or a foot in it, your choice).

The new Iraqi government (2005 edition) started the rebuilding of the Army (and other branches) from scratch. With heavy US and Allied assistance, the Army started to build Infantry Divisions, and take over responsibility for more and more parts of the country. In 2008, the new Iraqi military faced its first major test – retaking Basra from the Jaish al Mahdi and various Iranian handlers and IRGC groups. The Iraqi Operation Charge of the Knights did not start off too well. One brigade, fresh from initial training and only partly equipped, was shoved into the fight too early and quietly saw 50% of its troops melt away. That is when it got personal…

Yes, the Merlin pilot is going to sandblast you

Welcome to scenic Mahmud al Kasim!

I got sent from a semi-backwater, helping advise the Iraqi Army 10th Division, to advising the 14th Division (they were fighting in Basra). A handful of Brits, two Americans, and one Australian were going to give advice and do a little coordination with a company of US Apache helicopters and the British who were nearby.

OK, that comes out to about 2,000 Iraqis each

We few, we happy few

The Iraqis brought in their best – the 1st IA Division (later renamed the 1st QRF – Quick Reaction Force) to join the 14th, some other bits and pieces, and a Brigade of freshly trained and equipped National Police (similar to European Gendarmerie). They also had the Prime Minister, Interior Minister, and various fixers show up to smooth over the sluggish supply situation (10 stamps and signatures to get ammo, 13 if it was 14.5 mm or higher).  It worked. Some really long hours, one really loud artillery barrage, several 107 mm rockets seeming to have my name on them, and meeting some Iranian prisoners later – Basra was cleared. A triumph, right?  Actually it was the peak and start of the decline of that iteration of the Iraqi Army.

With simultaneous operations going on in Baghdad (Hi there, Sadr City!) and Basra – the Iraqis had really put the boot to internal enemies. The necessity of having this combat force, needed to protect against existential threats, began to pale in comparison to the drive to crony up the Army.  Before I left at the end of 2008, we were getting grumbling from authorities in the Kurdish area that the Iraqi Defense Ministry was replacing competent Kurdish commanders with crony Shias. The Sunni had a related beef that they were getting shut out of opportunities as part of score settling by the Shia dominated Government. Fuel, pay and supply pilferage, embezzlement, theft, and black marketeering had been a problem, even in 2008 (we used to watch the 10th Division get its fuel allotment and line up their own civilian vehicles, family members, and various connected or bribe bearing people to fill up in long line….then bitch they didn’t have enough fuel to conduct operations).  Without nosy Americans asking where things were, looking at records, and checking inventories, it went to pot – and don’t expect a fix to be fast.

By the time we had (temporarily, as it worked out) left Iraq, the seeds of decline were starting to bloom. Once ISIS kicked their way into Iraq, the post-2003 Iraqi Army had become unable to hold a large chunk of its own country.

After all this, the US looks like it will be back in the business of training the Iraqi Army once more. NOTE: This isn’t a “partisan” issue, as both Obama and Trump Administrations have committed.

What is the libertarian take on this?

The first reaction = “none of our business, goodbye.” Why should American taxpayers pay for training a foreign army? Internal squabbles on the other side of the world are not our business, nor our duty to settle.  A less hands-off reaction might be “better to train them than have US forces doing the fighting.” “ISIS is a threat to us, and they have made it clear they want to bring it everywhere – better to fight them over there, with locals, than wait for them to send the next truck to plow through a crowd, or some guys with nail-packed bomb vests take out a mall.”

Practically speaking, it appears that the Iraqis have not yet made the commitment to maintaining a capable force, even if we do rebuild it yet again. If they want to have us train them – fine, pay for it completely. See you at Fort Polk for training and humidity! Come on, guys NTC should be like home! Same goes for equipment… All you can buy! But going to the US Taxpayer well, once again, is not a very palatable option.

What are your thoughts, Glibs? In for a penny, in for a pound? We broke it, we fix it? Fuck off slaver? No, fuck you, cut spending?