In 2004-2005 I was part of the long and latest version of the wars in Afghanistan. I was the Civil Affairs Officer for one of the two Task Forces running around Parwan, Kapisa and part of Kabul province. My job – Go make nice with the locals, and keep your ears and eyes open.
“Daddy will be back to help in a minute”
“I thought the Marines did Toys for Tots, dang it!”
At the time, the Taliban was trying to reconstitute itself and come back into the country from Pakistan. A few of them managed to straggle in, without being vaporized by A-10s or such. Where I was, the asshats were primarily the HIG. Our local friends were all former Northern Alliance members.
The fellow on the left is Haji Almos – he was a commander of one of the Northern Alliance “corps” and a man rumored to have gained his wealth through opium and other smuggling operations. He “went legit” by running for office in the Wolesi Jirga (Parliament). During a meeting, he informed those in attendance that an endorsement from a particular American military officer in the area would carry great weight, and if he got it…well, we would have a friend in the Wolesi Jirga. (I was only slightly startled, being from the Chicagoland area.) I did ask that officer if, when he was at West Point, he was ever told he would be asked to be a Kingmaker in a far off land? That got me a chuckle and a shake of the head. We politely demurred and wished him luck, nonetheless. He won office that Fall. Here was a man that had basically fought on our side, offered political support…but it was, I think, because the wind was blowing our way. His actions after taking office were not all that nice. For what it is worth, he is not in office anymore.
The man on the right is Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili. He is dead. While still alive, he was appointed provincial police chief of the province I lived in. He cleaned out the Taliban and HIG, and was asked to take an even more dangerous assignment. The Taliban killed him by suicide bomber attack. Before we got there in 2001, he had personally aided hundreds of people fleeing the Taliban, fought those same Taliban and welcomed us. He closely cooperated with NATO all the way up to his death.
The man on the left, front is Kabir Ahmad. He was the government head of the district (roughly equivalent to an American County) I lived in. He had also been part of the fight against the Taliban, but moreso keeping things on the administrative side. He found out I was a lawyer back in America, and we hit it off (he was an attorney as well as administrator). Whenever something broke bad, he would be rushing to the scene with the district police (his office was kind of a County Chairman, Sheriff and District Attorney all rolled into one). He received death threats on a regular basis from the HIG, Taliban and anyone else who resented his fairly honest and efficient work. He was a tireless advocate for help improving the area I was working – anyone or anything he could wrangle to dig a well, build an agriculture cooperative building or the like. He was a brave man, a good man.
So what, if anything did we owe them? By “we,” I mean the taxpayers and military members of the countries involved in Afghanistan (primarily the US, but the UK, Canada and others had expended a considerable effort). The US led forces had come in to bash the Taliban over the head and get the AQ folks who had set up the 9/11/2001 attacks on the US. The Northern Alliance used our air support to push the Taliban back
“Here, and no further, went the Taliban”
and some of our own forces helped finish the job. Once the head bashing was done, we stuck around, dumped in more forces, and started doing mostly occupation and rebuilding things. Did we owe anything to the Afghans that had been on our side? They fought our enemies, helped us as much as they could…some of it out of self-interest (survival, primarily), some of it out of a sense of honor, and some out of an opportunity to use us to their own ends (both good and selfishly bad).
As a soldier, I felt a debt to them. These were allies and fellow combatants – they had been killing Taliban before any of us had even heard the name. But as a budding libertarian, I felt that we were sort of hanging around when it was not so much our job any more. Why was I, a 20 year Soldier, digging wells, building schools and trying not to get blowed up real good while doing so? Was I supporting and defending the Constitution of the United States from all enemies, foreign or domestic? This is what NATO was for?
So my question to all of you, is when is the debt paid? Was there a debt to begin with? Do we owe anything to the people that risk (and sometimes lose) their lives working on behalf of our government’s stated goals?
I struggle with it, partially because part of my heart is still in the Panjshir Valley, with Kabir Ahmad, and with the Sayedkhili family. But as a libertarian, I know that if you kick in the door and get the SOB inside the house– once you fix the door back up, or give the homeowner enough to fix it themselves…it is time to leave.
Update: Yes, I once did narrow my gaze at the entirety of Northeast Afghanistan
“Don’t think I missed any of that Parwan, Kapisa, Kabul or Panjshir…you too Badakhshan.
Hey man, this may sound trite, but thanks for your service and writing this piece.
^^^
Thirded
Fourthed. Just seeing this now as I’ve been really busy the past couple of days.
Holy shit dood, you were CA? I left the Imperial Guard as an E-5 in the 413th CA BN in Lubbock, TX. I loved CA, so much more fun than the actual war fighty stuff.
I started as an 11B, enlisted dude. Got an Ordnance Corps commission…when National Guard units get deployed, smart commanders don’t ask what your military job is, they want to know what you really do in the world. My Active Army commander was smart – as soon as I told him I was a lawyer, he got a big smile and said “Good. Now you are my CAO. Go talk to these people”. I was always out dragging some poor infantry squad or two with me, running around all over the place.
I gotta say, running hither and yon talking to locals perks my interest a hell of a lot more than any 11B shit. FFS at least don’t be leg, those guys break down. If you must do it, go mech.
My knees agree with you..
I was in a Civil Affairs unit my last 2 years in the Marine Reserves. I fucking hated it with a passion. Way too many fucking idiot officers (no offense). Way too little actual training or fun.
Drake, The person I replaced was not quite an idiot – but was certainly not … proficient. The other task force CAO WAS an idiot. World class fool. The poor grunts who had to patrol the area would duck him and come knock on our door to send someone with them so they could say “Thanks, we’re good”. Lots of Reserve and Guard units had stashed their …lesser officers into CA type positions, never knowing they would need someone with head not tucked up arse to do the work someday…
BTW – I totally love the Avatar, Drake.
Thanks!
In Marine Reserve combat units there was a dramatic dichotomy in officer quality. Rock-stars who could make more money in the civilian world but still liked being Marine Officers, and complete morons that the Fleet wanted nothing to do with. Us enlisted Radio Operators could spot who was who in seconds.
As befitting a misanthrope, I dealt only with gear. 5953 ATC radar technician.
Radar puke.
5952 – Navigational Aid technicians were where all the smart sexy guys ended up.
Oh you’re kidding me – a navaids guy is here? Smart indeed, because outside of setting up the TACAN how much did you guys really have to do?
It’s such a small community, I really am genuinely surprised. When were you in?
“…they had been killing Taliban before any of us had even heard the name.”
Looks like the soldiers and american taxpayers already did them a favor. I don’t mean to take anything away from these guys and I wish them the best, but after financing and carrying out the destruction of their enemies what more could we possibly owe them?
We called the Taliban our enemy too. The Taliban are still there. We can’t stay forever, nor should we have stayed as long as we did….but I am still puzzled as to where to draw the line and say “Done. Bye.”
Short of physically annihilating the Taliban, which is farcical, I’m not sure there really is a place to draw the line. We tried, it didn’t work, it’s time to go. Afghanistan was tragic before we got there and it will be tragic after we leave.
” I’m not sure there really is a place to draw the line.”
Me too. That is why I have an appointment with the bourbon bottle tonight, Chip.
I get that. Like I said in the comments below, I never mingled with the local population on deployment but friends of mine did, and many of them feel the same deep conflicts you’ve expressed. They know things will likely get pretty bad for the people they worked with and yet there isn’t much anyone can do about that unless we’re to keep a sizeable force there forever.
When Bin Laden was killed
I think that’s largely because the line was never drawn in the beginning of the conflict. It was always open-ended, and it got worse when the talk of bringing democracy to the rest of Central Asia and the Middle East became actual policy.
America has muddled around in these low intensity conflicts for decades now. It’s never been successful at them, and no other foreign power has either. We labor under the illusion that if we stay long enough, something will change that will alter the outcome in our benefit when it’s usually the exact opposite.
Always thought it should have been called an “expeditionary raid” like the British Expedition to Abyssinia. The Rangers and Paratroopers pulled off some brilliant ops early on. Once the Taliban had headed for the hills, we should have issued some stern warnings, maybe mounted some heads on pikes, and left.
yeah, and (following from my point below) i don’t know that it is ever easy to recognize when that point is, and that the nature of interventions always ends up with some confusion of interests as it evolves…. such that you can’t ever pinpoint exactly (as i think you actually can w/ Iraq) where things started to go off in the wrong directions.
From an outsider perspective…. I think in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that there had a been a theoretical formula worked out which said, “we’ll create the conditions for exit” … mainly by “staging an election”.
Have an election, have the international press pump it up, and SHAZAAM = we create the optical impression of having accomplished some Wilsonian Goal (“Spread Democracy”) even though that really was not at all our purpose in the first place.
The real purpose of the election was to create the conditions for exit. In theory.
I think the problems that followed were domestic (US) *political* ones, because the US leadership knew that the likelihood was that the cute+pretty ‘spreading democracy’ appearances would immediately fall apart when we removed US military support for that nascent ‘democratic’ regime. And when that happened, they would become politically vulnerable to accusations of ‘abandoning’ our mission.
So instead, what was “fake” democracy-building simply for the sake of ‘creating conditions for exit’…. ended up becoming “endlessly perpetuated theater”, which ultimately was indistinguishable from ACTUAL democracy creation.
I think some savvier military generals made this remark around 2006 or so as well; they basically said, “we seem to think that we can do the ‘post-war stuff’ on the cheap, and it will be ‘just good enough’ to allow us to disengage – but the fact is that it does the opposite = we end up constantly propping up a facade instead of building something to last, and probably spending more money/blood in the process than if we’d just engaged that mission sincerely”
The realists (Scowcroft and Brzezinski in particular) recognized this folly from the beginning but were largely ignored by the administration.
Yes, i think both of them warned of exactly that foreseeable scenario
perhaps because of Vietnam, or other past-examples, or whether they just grokked that “once you’re engaged in a conflict, suddenly a host of other concerns inevitably start to affect decision-making”
iow, the goals are always clear *beforehand*. On paper it sounds so neat & tidy. but once you’ve committed resources, sunken-cost-fallacy-effects + domestic optical-political worries can combine to completely overwhelm whatever the original “mission” was.
I think some ‘non-interventionists’ use this to argue against ANY form of military action, because (in their view) its basically impossible to do anything ‘quick and dirty and simple’. Every intervention ALWAYS becomes a muddle of interests once engaged, and the costs of untangling them often far outstrip the original perceived benefits of action.
And i think a lot of that was the prevailing view in the post-vietnam era, but was gradually erased by the “Mini-conflicts” that occurred in between, that ‘doing things small and fast’ (eg, Panama, Grenada, etc), that it was possible to use *some* force to accomplish limited objectives, and that the inevitable ‘scope creep’ could be avoided.
i can’t remember which books i read which pointed this out, but a number of people later argued that Gulf I “proved” to some people that larger-scale / limited-goal engagements were possible. And while initially it was predicated on the idea that such a thing would require “overwhelming force” and “instantaneous accomplishment of objectives”, etc…. the delusion spread in the late 1990s that our technological advantage was enough by itself to enable the same results with a light-footprint.
Well…. so much for that idea. 🙂 I almost feel bad for Donald Rumsfeld, really. I think he probably had some good ideas, but sort of ended up believing his own bullshit at exactly the wrong moment in history.
As I recall, there was a belief among certain parties (Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, etc..) that the legacy of Vietnam was something that needed to be overcome. That the reluctance to engage in a protracted conflict was a national failing of sorts. One that they were going to remedy by proving that the USA could reinvent the Middle East.
I find it interesting that you can go back and find video of ’94 Cheney explaining exactly why Bush I did not invade Iraq during the first Gulf War and it was spot on with what happened during and after Gulf War II: Sectarian Boogaloo.
Creveld spends a lot of time discussing low-intensity conflicts in The Transformation of War. His observation is that they never end well for the foreign power.
Now, it’s been quite a while so maybe I’m misremembering – weren’t either one or both of Rumsfeld and Cheney in favor of a fast war to topple Saddam and then getting out with the Iraqi exiles being installed as the new government? It was Powell and his asinine “you break it, you’ve bought it” nation-building policy who convinced Bush that there needed to be a large, longstanding occupation.
That was in fact the plan in the very early stages. call it ‘first draft’
(read the book “Cobra II” which is all about the war planning)
But that idea fell apart when the press got hold of the idea and then exposed Chalabi and his crew as inept fraud
Not quite. “plan b” was when they agreed there needed to be a State-Dept driven transition-plan after the invasion. That was Jay Garner.
Garner and his team went in with the invasion and were setting up their own offices, when within a month or 2, the plan changed, and “Plan C” was established… State Dept was out, and Paul Bremer and the DoD-lead CPA was in.
They’re the ones who disbanded the Iraqi military and launched a “debaathification” of the remaining civil service.
After than, it was done for.
Powell was the one who convinced them they needed Garner instead of the “dump Chalabi on the Iraqis”-plan, but he never convinced them to actually properly fund+staff any real transition effort. It would be wrong to think of his argument having won them over. More like, “They pandered to him by giving his guy a job, then making that job obsolete by simply replacing his department with a different one”
double footnote =
I’m sure my summary is only 80% accurate. I haven’t read that book in about 4 years (tho i’ve read it like 3 times; its good and worth it) and i am probably mixing up some angles slightly.
Regardless the core idea is that “the basic plan was always = get in, get out ASAP”; just how that was going to get done changed along the way. They always had some bits that made it look like they were intending to stay and try and clean up the mess , but it wasn’t sincere
I’d say it seems that Afghanistan is determined to remain a medieval culture regardless of what we do. Efforts to drag them forward several centuries didn’t work for the Soviets and hasn’t worked for us.
Oh, I never had any interest in changing anyone’s culture… talk about plowing the sea. I just am unsure when to say “Well, our work here is done” and ride off into the proverbial sunset.
It is possible, it is just not possible for a people with our moral standards.
That would be “destroy” more than “change”. The Japanese and Germans somehow did – but look what it took to get there…
Both countries had societies informed by ancient, advanced cultures in a way the Afghanis haven’t been. Whatever the faults of their political systems during the 1930’s-40’s, Germany and Japan came from relatively a highly civil base. When they were both crushingly defeated, the idea that their politics would have to change was unsurprising to their citizens. And the lack of post-war political vindictiveness among the Western powers surely helped allow those changes to be accepted.
I think its also worth pointing out in the case of Germany + Japan… that they really weren’t changing their ‘cultures’ – they were just changing their politics.
they had already evolved Western-style advanced political and economic institutions before the wars, and retained (most of) them after the war/occupation; the institutions largely persisted, albeit somewhat modified in cases.
What the US accomplished post-WWII with former enemies has few good parallels w/ our modern conflicts… which seem to involve trying to get countries still dominated by Tribal + sectarian forces to adopt non-tribal, non-sectarian institutions which they have absolutely zero incentives to maintain.
I don’t know about that. Japan’s culture changed a fair bit after the war, at least in some aspects. It went from a militaristic culture that glorified the warrior spirit to a downright pacifist culture.
this is the sort of nitpicking that I was trying to bypass with my (most of) parenthetical
I’d dispute that whatever changes in their culture that happened, happened because the US occupying authority ‘made’ it happen. Things changed, sure.
My point was about how you need strong independent, secular(ish) civil institutions for any western-style reforms. Arab countries/Afghanistan never even had The Enlightenment.
Sorry, I know everyone here knows this. I’ll try not to post unless I have something to add.
Some things just need sayin, BP.
we have changes many nations cultures. And for the better in my opinion.
We just don’t do it Top Down.
When we try we get shitfuckistan.
I get that. My feeling is that without changing the culture, however, our goals (nebulous though they are) cannot be achieved. Then again, I was never there so I can only go by what I’ve read. Even if I had gone there, my MOS was such that I wouldn’t have encountered the natives anyway. When I was in Iraq, the only Iraqis I ever came across were the few guys who ran the little market on base. All of the other workers on the base were TCNs – I met far more Indians and Nepalese than Iraqis.
And Bangladeshi barbers… After all my relevant experience in Afghanistan (I even got to a bit of passable Dari) I was, naturally, called up again, early and sent to Iraq to advise an Iraqi Army Infantry Division.
I would like to point out that selling them Coke and McDonalds would be a better approach.
All the countries since fucking Rome have tried the military approach, it always ends in tears. To quote Leia (PBUHN, may she rest in peace), “the more you tighten your grip, the more the Rebel Alliance will slip through your fingers.”
Economics says incentives matter, not all incentives are monetary. Ego and pride are often big fucking deals.
This. What was the Iraqi quote Instapundit used to post shortly after the elections there? “We want whiskey, sexy.”
Still, that doesn’t mean that sentiment exists everywhere, or even that the US govt is responsible for spreading it.
If we do owe them a debt, we have to be very careful that the right people get it. I don’t know the right answer, moral or legal.
For every Kabir Ahmad, there were 40 Haji Almos.
I think you answered it.
I was on an O&G exploration job north of Mazzar Sharif up by the Uzbek border in 2012. I never would have went if the job was in the south. The north is peaceful by Afghan standards, and we still had a couple guys blown up. I think it comes down to them fixing their own country at some point.
M-i-S?!! Yikes. I just hope when Dostum croaks, the area doesn’t see a bloody faction fight to see who the new top dog will be.
I don’t know, and or follow the local politics there. I would imagine if there is a place for a bloody faction fight for top dog, it is anywhere in Afghanistan. As well as any number of places on the planet. I don’t think you can force a region into the first world. They have to get there on their own. It is sad, and too many die, but I think it is the way it is. There is not enough money in the world to fix some places.
I think you answered it in the last sentence, Swiss.
Great article, brother.
We brought the Hmong over. Stuck a bunch of them in Minnesota and Wisconsin for some reason but we got them out.
Has there been a similar thing proposed for Afghans?
Only individuals.
I’ve always wondered – many Hmong fled to the US but not many Montagnards. Wonder why that was.
The Hmong should provide a case study for trying to re-settle primitives in an advanced society. From what I saw when I lived in WI in the ’90s, twenty years of living here hadn’t done much to assimilate them. They were terrible “neighbors” and an endless fount of petty crime and general unhappiness.
As the husband of 12 years of a woman of part Hmong heritage, I am pleased to say, fuck you and the horse you rode in on.
Gentlemen, there’s no fighting in a war article!
And there’s this:
http://urbanmilwaukee.com/2015/10/24/huge-new-hmong-market-will-have-90-vendors/
I wish we had a place like that around here. My kingdom for some lemon grass.
Yeah that kills me, I have a good hmong friend and I asked her “How cruel is it to take a native tropical population and put them in MN?” She says it is a running joke int he hmong community.
Well, if you believe Gran Torino it was the fault of the Lutherans.
It was in my hometown – the Lutheran Churches sponsored some Hmong in. The Illinois – Wisconsin border was a bit alien to them, to say the least. But it worked out eventually.
See also, Minnesota and Somalis.
My war was the First Gulf War. Since Kuwait is still there and friendly I guess I don’t have that dilemma.
But I look at all wars as sunk costs within few years after the shooting stops. I didn’t lose any friends there but did see Marines killed and wounded not far from our position. As far as I’m concerned, they died for the Corps and their friends. I repaid what I could by trying to be the best Marine and later the best National Guardsman I could be. I don’t think we owe Kuwait or Afghanistan anything. It’s up to them to live well and fight their own demons.
Since you solicited my views, for whatever they’re worth, I’d say we want to keep open the possibility that we may be at war in some other country in future and need some local collaborators. Some “opportunists” may be trying to decide whether to help us, and then they’re told, “don’t help the Americans, they’ll stab you in the back! They won’t lift a finger to relocate you to their country if things get too hot here. They’ll use you and throw you away like a dirty Kleenex.”
We don’t want to be *that* country. Yes, we shouldn’t be doing so much invading, but when we do, we should have the credibility to assure potential collaborators we have their back.
Lt Col Grossman, in his book On Killing (this was before he went off the cop-sucking deep end) related one anecdote from a German WWII soldier who was told by his grandfather to be a good soldier and follow orders, and to “surrender to the first Americans you see.” There’s certainly some value in being seen as virtuous fighters, especially when you consider, say, the way the Russians treated German soldiers who surrendered.
In short, I agree. And perhaps assuming that our protection is part of the cost of waging war will give our bumbling warmongers a little pause before haphazardly deciding to invade.
There is more than one story of german units fighting their way through the Russian so they could syrrender to the Americans.
I don’t know if any of them are true. That is what pissed me off so much about Abu Graib (phone with no spell check).
Hey Swiss, I knew a few guys who served over in Afghanistan with the CAF. One of them encountered, and had to operate with a local, I guess you could say, ‘militia leader’ with certain proclivities. Ever have to deal with that?
Yeah. once. We had a semi naked and bleeding pre-teen boy escape and make it to the front gate of our base – the medics took him and fixed him up. The garrison commander told them to find his family and get him back home. if the guy he got away from asked, we knew nothing.
We also had one local Pashtun militia asshole (in a Tajik area) who we nicknamed “Baron Harkonnen”, and it wasn’t just because he was fat and sinister looking…
Not sure how I’d be able to handle that, suppose you can just do what you can and not let it haunt you.
Shed some tears, once every few years. Drink some bourbon and try to get up and forget about it the next day. Works so far.
I will drive up to Chi-town and hand you a bottle/bag if you ever need it.
Thanks Bacon – if we ever have a meet up of the IL Glibs, we will shout out to ya.
I’m here late.
Interesting article. I don’t know where the line is, but where ever it is, I think America stayed too long.
Like bacon, if I’m near Chi-town and you need a bottle, I’ll bring you one.
Just saw this via Instapundit. “A state senator is removed from the chamber for her comments about Tom Hayden and Vietnam.”
In the statement which she later posted on her official Senate website , Nguyen criticized Hayden for siding “with a communist government that enslaved and/or killed millions of Vietnamese, including members of my own family.”
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-a-state-senator-is-removed-from-the-1487881031-htmlstory.html
“”I was told I cannot speak on the issue at all,” she said.”
#NeverthelessShePersisted
Let’s hope that obnoxious hashtag gets highjacked by Ms. Nguyen and her supporters.
It would be a Win-Nguyen situation.
Dammit, Eddie.
*narrows gaze*
Joins Swiss in narrowing gaze.
* SLAP *
OK I read, she broke procedure. Being a parliamentarian myself this is a sin worse than deep dish.
I suspect if she were praising him, rather than cursing, nothing would have been done.
That would have been wrong too.
So I’m going to assume that the media is furiously denouncing these arrogant white male shitlords for silencing a WoC, right? RIGHT?
I was looking for something in the definition of “Realism” (in foreign relations theory) which would apply here, and think this suits =
…In the realist tradition, security is based on the principle of a balance of power and the reliance on morality as the sole determining factor in statecraft is considered impractical. According to the Wilsonian approach, on the other hand, the spread of democracy abroad as a foreign policy is key and morals are universally valid. During the Presidency of Bill Clinton, American diplomacy reflected the Wilsonian school to such a degree that those in favor of the realist approach likened Clinton’s policies to social work. According to Kennan, whose concept of American diplomacy was based on the realist approach, such moralism without regard to the realities of power and the national interest is self-defeating and will lead to the erosion of power, to America’s detriment.[5]
Even if we want the effects of our policy to be implemented in “moral ways”, polices are not chosen for purposes of advancing moral interests.
Meaning = we didn’t go to Afghanistan to save Afghans from themselves. While we were there (smashing Taliban heads and sending a message to all the other countries potentially harboring known-jihadis) we could certainly insist on “Doing things in a moral fashion” and helping out people who we recognized as being moral actors in the best interests of their fellow countymen, etc…. but at the end of the day, the relationship is based on mutual self interest, and the point at which ‘helping them’ is no longer in our self-interests is the point at which it is best for BOTH parties to end the relationship; else we turn Soldiers into charity-workers and watch our former ‘voluntary allies’ begin to use that transformed role to their own self-interests
there’s a lot to say here but i’ll just stop there.
Just to bring a little humor:
Rumor is the Taliban had a legend they feared the most: *The Narrowed Gaze*
See update.
It’s everything I thought it would be.
So what pun did NE Afghanistan make, to warrant that?
Oh puns are merely the easiest way to draw a narrowed gaze. At that point, I think it had been 6 months of getting sporadically rocketed by the HIG, one asshole shooting an RPG over my head and 120 days of continuing high winds and dust storms just finishing. The whole region deserved it.
Nice!
Curious, why do all the comment tags have a 2017 date?
Nevermind. For some reason, I mistakenly thought the Glibs site hadn’t been around since this time last year.
I’ll show myself out!
Amazing
It is long past time to get out. Anyone that feels a debt to afghanistan should do what they can to repay it, but our government sending more American soldiers and taxpayer dollars there is wrong in so many ways I dont even know where to start.
The ME meddling is no different than what I have seen so many other places. We go in, fuck up a lot of stuff, hurt a lot of people and when we leave everything is the same as before we arrived. New names running the cartels, soldiers shuffled around to different gangs, bigger better labs just in different locations, everything rocking along just like before.
As mentioned upthread unless we are willing to really let the hammer down and get our hands bloody we cant change cultures.
Thank you for your service to our country and to your Swiss overlords. Good article. Keep up the narrowed gazes.