Back to little old me, for links. We simply cannot count on the awesome presence of ZARDOZ every day, you know. With that in mind, have some Links before Happy Hour (assuming you are in a civilized time zone, i.e. Central)
OK you lot, Afternoon links for ya. Even a bit early. Try to read a couple before going OT and posting a dozen of your own, yes?… What is that? I am being overly sensitive?! ME?!!! WHY I …
*storms out wiping away tears of rage*
Due to a completely random car attack, Westminster Bridge saw dozens of casualties, then it got a bit stabby/shooty outside Parliament… probably the IRA.
How did Florida Man get his python a work permit in Dresden, Germany?
It appears that the Iraqi Army is going to retake Mosul. It has been slow going, and they have had to use the US and other Air Forces (plus some ..um, irregulars) to finish the job. How, after so many years of training and arming the Iraqi Army, did this state of affairs come to pass?
First, a little background. The Iraqi Army at the beginning of 1979 was of respectable size, and it was fully equipped with Soviet export-grade equipment. Its doctrine and training were the usual crude aping of Soviet doctrine. Heavy reliance on numbers and artillery with tanks. Not very flexible and individual initiative was all but non-existent. The Iraqi Air Force was similarly Soviet armed and organized. The 8 year war with Iran 1980-1988 degraded this force significantly.
Then the Iraqis really got their arses kicked. An exhausted and broken army faced the peak Cold War ready forces of the US, UK, France, and others. The results, in retrospect, were what should have been expected (I chuckle remembering Edward Luttwak and other “experts” warning that the “battle hardened” Iraqi Army would be a tough fight). Cut to a dozen years later, and they were in even worse shape – while their enemies were fielding even more advanced forces. What was left of the Iraqi Army was clubbed down, faded away, and the country was occupied in 2003. Long story short – this was not a history of success, no tradition of excellence, or a force that could adapt, change, and improve. So that was the situation when we decided to put a hand to it (or a foot in it, your choice).
The new Iraqi government (2005 edition) started the rebuilding of the Army (and other branches) from scratch. With heavy US and Allied assistance, the Army started to build Infantry Divisions, and take over responsibility for more and more parts of the country. In 2008, the new Iraqi military faced its first major test – retaking Basra from the Jaish al Mahdi and various Iranian handlers and IRGC groups. The Iraqi Operation Charge of the Knights did not start off too well. One brigade, fresh from initial training and only partly equipped, was shoved into the fight too early and quietly saw 50% of its troops melt away. That is when it got personal…
Welcome to scenic Mahmud al Kasim!
I got sent from a semi-backwater, helping advise the Iraqi Army 10th Division, to advising the 14th Division (they were fighting in Basra). A handful of Brits, two Americans, and one Australian were going to give advice and do a little coordination with a company of US Apache helicopters and the British who were nearby.
We few, we happy few
The Iraqis brought in their best – the 1st IA Division (later renamed the 1st QRF – Quick Reaction Force) to join the 14th, some other bits and pieces, and a Brigade of freshly trained and equipped National Police (similar to European Gendarmerie). They also had the Prime Minister, Interior Minister, and various fixers show up to smooth over the sluggish supply situation (10 stamps and signatures to get ammo, 13 if it was 14.5 mm or higher). It worked. Some really long hours, one really loud artillery barrage, several 107 mm rockets seeming to have my name on them, and meeting some Iranian prisoners later – Basra was cleared. A triumph, right? Actually it was the peak and start of the decline of that iteration of the Iraqi Army.
With simultaneous operations going on in Baghdad (Hi there, Sadr City!) and Basra – the Iraqis had really put the boot to internal enemies. The necessity of having this combat force, needed to protect against existential threats, began to pale in comparison to the drive to crony up the Army. Before I left at the end of 2008, we were getting grumbling from authorities in the Kurdish area that the Iraqi Defense Ministry was replacing competent Kurdish commanders with crony Shias. The Sunni had a related beef that they were getting shut out of opportunities as part of score settling by the Shia dominated Government. Fuel, pay and supply pilferage, embezzlement, theft, and black marketeering had been a problem, even in 2008 (we used to watch the 10th Division get its fuel allotment and line up their own civilian vehicles, family members, and various connected or bribe bearing people to fill up in long line….then bitch they didn’t have enough fuel to conduct operations). Without nosy Americans asking where things were, looking at records, and checking inventories, it went to pot – and don’t expect a fix to be fast.
By the time we had (temporarily, as it worked out) left Iraq, the seeds of decline were starting to bloom. Once ISIS kicked their way into Iraq, the post-2003 Iraqi Army had become unable to hold a large chunk of its own country.
After all this, the US looks like it will be back in the business of training the Iraqi Army once more. NOTE: This isn’t a “partisan” issue, as both Obama and Trump Administrations have committed.
What is the libertarian take on this?
The first reaction = “none of our business, goodbye.” Why should American taxpayers pay for training a foreign army? Internal squabbles on the other side of the world are not our business, nor our duty to settle. A less hands-off reaction might be “better to train them than have US forces doing the fighting.” “ISIS is a threat to us, and they have made it clear they want to bring it everywhere – better to fight them over there, with locals, than wait for them to send the next truck to plow through a crowd, or some guys with nail-packed bomb vests take out a mall.”
Practically speaking, it appears that the Iraqis have not yet made the commitment to maintaining a capable force, even if we do rebuild it yet again. If they want to have us train them – fine, pay for it completely. See you at Fort Polk for training and humidity! Come on, guys NTC should be like home! Same goes for equipment… All you can buy! But going to the US Taxpayer well, once again, is not a very palatable option.
What are your thoughts, Glibs? In for a penny, in for a pound? We broke it, we fix it? Fuck off slaver? No, fuck you, cut spending?
Good morning, Glibs. I have assembled a few links for your scorn and defiance; slight regard, contempt, and any thing that may not misbecome the mighty sender.
OMG, Teh Werld is ending…so lets read about just that.
Think you’ve got what it takes to design our logo? Think you can submit it to us at submit@glibertarians.com by Saturday, March 4th at noon? Then we have just the thing for you.
This man is an artistAnd this is his art
We want you guys to design what will be the face of Glibertarians…the icon on our twitter handle, even! So send us in your finished products in .tif, .jpg or even lowly .pdf (I’m not judging, SugarFree is) to us by the above date. Winning submissions (and some really awful ones for the lulz) will be revealed Tuesday, March 7th in the evening.
Now go out there and make us proud!
P.S.: If Chimpy McHalliburton can draw, you can too. So no excuses!
And now for the legal stuff… [NOTE: This differs from our normal Disclaimer]
By submitting your entry, you confirm that all intellectual property rights in it are yours and you grant to us an irrevocable and perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully-paid, royalty-free, worldwide license, by ourselves or with others, to use, copy, distribute, publicly perform, publicly display, print, publish, republish, excerpt (in whole or in part), reformat, translate, modify, revise and incorporate into other works, that submission and any works derived from that submission, in any form of media or expression, in the manner in which we choose.
Folks, in plain English that means you are submitting something original and yours – then it becomes ours. Completely ours. We will credit you as the artiste and laud you in these here pages. But we get to show it, sell it, make T-Shirts and mugs out of it (assuming our orphan workers are creative enough) or write it in the sky with fireworks – our choice. You still game? Good – send ‘em in and we’ll let you know if you are the lucky winner.
In 2004-2005 I was part of the long and latest version of the wars in Afghanistan. I was the Civil Affairs Officer for one of the two Task Forces running around Parwan, Kapisa and part of Kabul province. My job – Go make nice with the locals, and keep your ears and eyes open.
“Daddy will be back to help in a minute”“I thought the Marines did Toys for Tots, dang it!”
At the time, the Taliban was trying to reconstitute itself and come back into the country from Pakistan. A few of them managed to straggle in, without being vaporized by A-10s or such. Where I was, the asshats were primarily the HIG. Our local friends were all former Northern Alliance members.
The fellow on the left is Haji Almos – he was a commander of one of the Northern Alliance “corps” and a man rumored to have gained his wealth through opium and other smuggling operations. He “went legit” by running for office in the Wolesi Jirga (Parliament). During a meeting, he informed those in attendance that an endorsement from a particular American military officer in the area would carry great weight, and if he got it…well, we would have a friend in the Wolesi Jirga. (I was only slightly startled, being from the Chicagoland area.) I did ask that officer if, when he was at West Point, he was ever told he would be asked to be a Kingmaker in a far off land? That got me a chuckle and a shake of the head. We politely demurred and wished him luck, nonetheless. He won office that Fall. Here was a man that had basically fought on our side, offered political support…but it was, I think, because the wind was blowing our way. His actions after taking office were not all that nice. For what it is worth, he is not in office anymore.
The man on the right is Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili. He is dead. While still alive, he was appointed provincial police chief of the province I lived in. He cleaned out the Taliban and HIG, and was asked to take an even more dangerous assignment. The Taliban killed him by suicide bomber attack. Before we got there in 2001, he had personally aided hundreds of people fleeing the Taliban, fought those same Taliban and welcomed us. He closely cooperated with NATO all the way up to his death.
The man on the left, front is Kabir Ahmad. He was the government head of the district (roughly equivalent to an American County) I lived in. He had also been part of the fight against the Taliban, but moreso keeping things on the administrative side. He found out I was a lawyer back in America, and we hit it off (he was an attorney as well as administrator). Whenever something broke bad, he would be rushing to the scene with the district police (his office was kind of a County Chairman, Sheriff and District Attorney all rolled into one). He received death threats on a regular basis from the HIG, Taliban and anyone else who resented his fairly honest and efficient work. He was a tireless advocate for help improving the area I was working – anyone or anything he could wrangle to dig a well, build an agriculture cooperative building or the like. He was a brave man, a good man.
So what, if anything did we owe them? By “we,” I mean the taxpayers and military members of the countries involved in Afghanistan (primarily the US, but the UK, Canada and others had expended a considerable effort). The US led forces had come in to bash the Taliban over the head and get the AQ folks who had set up the 9/11/2001 attacks on the US. The Northern Alliance used our air support to push the Taliban back
“Here, and no further, went the Taliban”
and some of our own forces helped finish the job. Once the head bashing was done, we stuck around, dumped in more forces, and started doing mostly occupation and rebuilding things. Did we owe anything to the Afghans that had been on our side? They fought our enemies, helped us as much as they could…some of it out of self-interest (survival, primarily), some of it out of a sense of honor, and some out of an opportunity to use us to their own ends (both good and selfishly bad).
As a soldier, I felt a debt to them. These were allies and fellow combatants – they had been killing Taliban before any of us had even heard the name. But as a budding libertarian, I felt that we were sort of hanging around when it was not so much our job any more. Why was I, a 20 year Soldier, digging wells, building schools and trying not to get blowed up real good while doing so? Was I supporting and defending the Constitution of the United States from all enemies, foreign or domestic? This is what NATO was for?
So my question to all of you, is when is the debt paid? Was there a debt to begin with? Do we owe anything to the people that risk (and sometimes lose) their lives working on behalf of our government’s stated goals?
I struggle with it, partially because part of my heart is still in the Panjshir Valley, with Kabir Ahmad, and with the Sayedkhili family. But as a libertarian, I know that if you kick in the door and get the SOB inside the house– once you fix the door back up, or give the homeowner enough to fix it themselves…it is time to leave.
Update: Yes, I once did narrow my gaze at the entirety of Northeast Afghanistan
“Don’t think I missed any of that Parwan, Kapisa, Kabul or Panjshir…you too Badakhshan.
