This is the world globalists want!“Green Lives Matter” – Yes, our Border Patrol actually believes this shit.
Earlier this week, President Trump delivered his second annual speech concerning his administration’s national security strategy. In it, Trump presented a Manichean world, in which America’s cultural, economic, and military hegemony must be maintained at all costs against an insidious Asiatic peril that consists of the combined forces of Cathay and the Volga Tartar. While it is encouraging to finally see recognition of the fact that “history” is far from over, with Trump specifically, and without obfuscation, declaring Russia and China as “rival” nations of which “protection” of a nebulously defined American economic interest is a prerequisite for “cooperation,” one is forced to inquire in what essential way does Trump’s national security policy deviate from the zero-sumWeltanschauung of the neoconservatives?
After all, it was Trump’s putative national security and foreign policies that were the banner Rockwellians held aloft, front and center, when declaring a ‘libertarian case for Trump’. Instead, the bill of goods sold to libertarians by Bannon, Gorka, Miller, et alia was merely the The Project for a New American Century covered with a lamina of mercantilistic trade protectionism. Thus, what we have now is a mandate to para-militarize our borders to serve the triple purposes of escalating the Wars on Drugs, Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration; increased federal spending to defense and infrastructure cronies; going all-in on the Israeli position in the Middle East, the provision of arms to Ukraine, and continued support for adventures abroad to “confront, discredit, and defeat radical Islamic terrorism and ideology.” As we have learned on Monday, there is no meaningful distinction between the Trump administration’s strategy and the six major articles of the Wolfowitz Doctrine.
A short background and observations on the current Afghanistan situation, as it involves Pakistan & India.
History
The nations of Afghanistan and Pakistan are not friends. The Afghans have been fuming about getting split up by the British (see this article for some background on the “Durand Line”)
Before
After
Pakistan’s intel service, the ISI (a real “Deep State” if there is one to be used as an example) pretty much used/uses the Taliban, and the horrible Haqqani organization as a tool to keep Afghanistan either in turmoil, or a client state. Either way, in no position to revisit the map. Needless to say, the Afghans have been a wee bit miffed about this. The latest growling from Kabul is an example of this.
So what does India have to do with this?
But with foreign military support lessening, Afghanistan is not in a position to do much more than grumble. But they do have one sure way to get the Pakistani goat, so to speak. Seek support from India. “Gosh, Pakistan…I know you guys are mortal enemies, but there really isn’t any threat in us having closer ties with India!” Or, as their Ambassador to India delicately put it:
“Kabul would never allow anyone to use its soil against others. We are an independent country and we hope Pakistan would see Afghanistan as such.”
India (along with Iran) was a refuge for many during the Northern Alliance vs Taliban throwdown. It still was the medical tourism destination for those with the means to get there when I was in country, 2004-2005.
India benefits from this Afghan flirtation in a couple of ways. First, they get to tweak Pakistan a bit, and send a bit of a message – “Hey, you know that Kashmir thing you guys are always banging on about? How would you like a problem like that on your ‘Pashtunistan’ border?” Second, they have a potential market and trading partner. Any libertarian worth their monocle chain would be glad of reason #2, if not so much #1. As a side note, one of the developments that would help this Afghan-Indian trade involves a little work in Iran. Better than shipping the IRGC pallets of cash and propping up their nuclear weapons program.
What to watch?
I am keen to see the reactions of India and Pakistan to the inevitable wrap up of direct US military involvement in Afghanistan. As for Pakistan, I fear the ISI will say “see, we are winning – Taliban harder!” As for India, I hope they continue to step up trade and support of Afghanistan.
I would welcome your observations, relevant links and thoughts in the comments.
Non-interventionists of every stripe from libertarians to paleo conservatives to standard anti-war types have had their dreams dashed this past week after the president announced a troop surge in Afghanistan. To be fair, the president had already been offering mixed results to non-interventionists. Some actions were commendable, such as ending the CIA program that was arming Syrian opposition groups (BBC News), while others were the same interventionist impulses that we’ve seen from every post-World War II administration, such as bombing Syrian airfields (CNN). But even those who justified their support for President Trump’s election by noting his less militaristic foreign policy never truly believed that he would fulfill their long held dreams of closing overseas military bases, and ending American support for quasi-wars undertaken by our allies (such as the conflicts in Yemen or Syria). Writing in the American Conservative (a publication founded by anti-war conservatives opposed to the Iraq War) Robert Merry noted that based off of polling “it seems that the preponderance of public opinion ran counter to both of those foreign policy philosophies [neoconservative and liberal interventionism]. Donald Trump, in his often crude manner, captured this opposition view.”
Relationship status: It’s complicated.
With Trump, it was believed, we would finally have a conversation about our relationship with Russia, which some have argued has been overly hostile and counterproductive since the end of the Cold War (The National Interest and the American Conservative). With Trump we could finally ask the question of whether it is worthwhile to pledge open-ended military support, through NATO expansion, to countries such as Montenegro with little benefit to our own security. With Trump we could finally discuss the cost, both financially and morally, of engaging in and supporting barbaric wars against Yemen and Syria (to name a few), which pose no threat to our country. With Trump, some dreamed, we might finally come to debate the words of President Eisenhower who warned of the unchecked powers being acquired by the ‘military-industrial complex’ or, even better, we might rediscover President Washington’s warning about ‘foreign entanglements’. But, why did these non-interventionists hope that these conversations might be possible, but only with Trump?
President Trump is not a principled or moral man. He is a thrice married, petty man who finds it more important to engage in school yard taunts with his opponents rather than arguing over policy. He is no scholar, as he himself has admitted that he rarely reads (The New Republic) and, with regards to foreign policy, he has said that “I’m speaking with myself [about foreign policy], number one, because I have a very good brain and I’ve said a lot of things” (POLITICO). He is, on nearly every issue, malleable. But, since the 1980’s, when Trump first flirted with the idea of running for political office, he has been consistent on two topics: foreign affairs and trade. As early as 1987, during the height of the Cold War, Trump stated that the US “should stop paying to defend countries that can afford to defend themselves” and advocated for nuclear disarmament (NY Times). During the 2016 campaign, Trump’s advocacy for non-interventionism became a topic of debate, as it was alleged that he had voiced support for the Iraq War, based upon an exchange between himself and Howard Stern. Some Republicans who had voted against the Iraq War, such as former representative John Hostettler, defended the real estate magnate and said “Last night, in the midst of the first presidential debate, the moderator prefaced a question about Sen. Clinton’s vote to authorize the Iraq War with the suggestion that Donald Trump’s comments to a shock jock prior to Sen. Clinton’s vote was equivalent to that vote” (Washington Examiner). There is little evidence to suggest that Trump was ever an interventionist, whereas he has made statements in the past and during the 2016 campaign that delighted non-interventionist advocates throughout the country, such as his skepticism about NATO commitments and opposition to continued military involvement in Syria. Even his recent declaration about a troop surge in Afghanistan was preceded by numerous reports stating that Trump was rebuffing the requests of his generals, and fellow Republicans, who were requesting that surge (The Intercept and POLITICO). It is quite logical to understand why some non-interventionists saw him as a preferable option than the status quo offered by his opponents.
Yet some supposed non-interventionists have gone about berating others who had hoped (and some still hope) that, at the very least, the Trump administration would be nominally better than sixteen years of intense interventionism. These supposed non-interventionists have gone about declaring that they have been vindicated and they have begun pondering whether those who oppose war and voted for Trump are ‘gullible’ (Reason). This is a rather odd assertion to be made, considering that most of these people did not vote for even a nominal non-interventionist in 2016. Of Trump’s 2016 opponents, only Jill Stein was more stringently opposed to adventurism overseas than him. Yet, beyond Stein, the other two major candidates were significantly more predisposed to war than Trump. Specifically, I would highlight the Libertarian Party candidate, Gary Johnson, who was the preferred choice for many of the supposed non-interventionists that are sneering now.
… Also complicated.
In 2012, when Johnson first ran for the presidency, he offered a mixed bag with regards to foreign policy in an interview with the Daily Caller. He suggested a 43% reduction in defense spending, but he also said that “he supports America’s efforts to aid African troops in tracking down Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony and that he wouldn’t rule out leaving behind American bases in Afghanistan” (Daily Caller). Around the same time, in an interview with the Weekly Standard, Johnson also said that he supported the notion of the US waging war on humanitarian grounds (Weekly Standard). These positions are almost indistinguishable from the long-forgotten breed of warmonger once known as the ‘Rockefeller Republican’. Make war, but on the cheap. As if cost is the only issue to consider when waging unnecessary wars. More recently, in 2016, Johnson tried to avoid foreign policy issues and became less hawkish and more non-interventionist in his attitude to conflicts. He told CNN in 2016, that in order to solve the conflict in Syria he believed that “There is only one solution to Syria, and that’s being hand in hand with Russia diplomatically to solve that” (CNN). A position, ironically enough, that was nearly indistinguishable from that of Trump. But beyond a few flubs, of which the media exaggerated, Johnson spent little time discussing his foreign policy vision in 2016. So if the contention of these supposed non-interventionists sneering at Trump voters now is that Trump’s past statements, and those during the 2016 race, were not sufficient enough to conclude that Trump would be a non-interventionist than why were Johnson’s decidedly pro-interventionist positions supposed to have made him a better alternative? The only ‘gullible’ voters in 2016 were those who refused to accept what they were hearing.
At this time, it would appear that President Trump is behaving as a standard Republican president with regards to foreign policy, with a few exceptions. Nine months into his administration, we cannot determine if Trump will correct his way and become non-interventionist or continue with the interventionist foreign policy that has dominated Washington since the end of World War II. More likely than not, Trump will end up being more restrained, in some regards, than his two immediate predecessors. Which, some might argue, is still preferable than a continuation of the status quo. In hindsight, it appears that the only moral vote a non-interventionist could have made in the 2016 election was to either vote for Jill Stein or abstain. But at the time, in November 2016, there was good reason for non-interventionists to be hopeful about the prospect of a Trump presidency. And no one should fault them for the choice that they made, based upon the information that they had available at the time.
Reading this, I felt a sense of dread – not just because I am familiar with the terrible situation in Afghanistan, and knew how the dead from both the attack and the protest were innocents. Rather, it reminded me of 1992-1996.
Now that you see the protests and a ham handed reaction by the current central government, I am reminded of one of the Taliban’s advantages. When the Talib swept up from the South and Southeast of the country to take Kabul and most of the rest of the country – the populace was bone weary of the constant violence and accepted the immediate calm they brought in their wake.
A difference now is that the Talib are responsible for most of the attacks and violence, rather than prime assholes like the recent returnee to Kabul, Hekmatyar Gulbuddin. Other scum like the Haqqanishave chipped in too. But when you cannot even carry on a normal day without worrying about being blown up, you get to be more amenable to accepting whomever can give you security.
I am not sure who will come out on top of this new round of murder and chaos – but I am absolutely sure of the losers. The people of Kabul (and elsewhere in country) are 100% sure to lose.
I have previously described how being cheerful, helpful and non-intrusive had help possibly save me from getting blowed up real good. Well, the other side of the Afghan War (2001-present version) knows a thing or two about sowing doubt and mistrust. And they used just such a tactic against us in the area I was responsible for.
Some of the 3/116th INF at Qarabaghi-Robat
I spent a fair amount of time accompanying the 3/116th INF’s (VA ARNG) patrols in the area around Bagram, AF. Almost every time, the people were a mix of curious, glad, interested or slightly wary when they saw us. However, one of the times I was given quite a fright came when I went with a patrol to the village of Qarabaghi-Robat.
Our patrol had a local policeman along with us – and his behavior told me something was wrong from the get go. Normally, we would come to a village and the inevitable crowd would gather. We would then ask to see the village elder(s) and let them show us around, talk about what was going on in the area, etc. This time was different. Our policeman started suggesting that we wait outside the village, and he would go find the elder and bring him to us. When we told him that we had to go into the village, he became very agitated. He left to find someone while we waited where you see in the picture below.
Crowd gathering at Qarabaghi Robat
The people that did gather around while we waited for the elder were not acting normal either – sullen, not talkative (a non-talkative Afghan from the Bagram area was truly alarming) and they made my interpreter nervous. The interpreter (a fellow from Kabul) told me that the people were not happy we were there – and they were making rather rude and crude remarks about us, and him as well.
Eventually the policeman returned and told us no elder or other representative of the village was around, and we should wait for them outside the village. Before I could think of something suitably sarcastic to say, the NCO leading the patrol said, “You tell him we are going to look around, and he can wait somewhere else if he wants,” to our interpreter. The policeman then did leave, much to my surprise. Also, the crowd had grown in size and surliness.
The NCO and I looked at each other, shrugged, and moved out. A group of men of the village followed us as we walked through the center of the village and turned down an alley. We had obviously gone someplace nobody wanted us to go by the villager’s reaction. They were getting louder, and our interpreter mentioned they were starting to make threats.
When we got to the end of the alley, one of the soldiers told me he had walked over a hollow sounding patch of ground – and that when his platoon had been in the South of Afghanistan (near the Pakistan border), this was how many weapons caches were hidden. We stopped to check the spot out, borrowing a shovel from the property owner (he looked like he had just sucked an entire lemon). The covered over pit was full of garbage, and we figured it wasn’t a weapons cache – but as we were giving the shovel back, the interpreter told us that “these people are crazy”. I asked him why, he said that they were telling him how they were going to kill him, and then all of us. I thought about it, and drew inspiration from that legendary hero – King Arthur, of Monty Python and the Holy Grail – RUN AWAY! RUN AWAY!
I quietly mentioned to the NCO what was being said, and we agreed it was time to leave Qarabaghi-Robat.
As we were leaving, the village elder suddenly appeared. He confined his conversation to asking for supplies and help with the local school. I was upset at first, but then had to admire the man. Here were his people threatening to kill us, and he wanted school supplies…
We went back to Bagram AF and reported everything. Later, I had the leader of the area around that village, one Haji Sultan Qand (aka “Commander Qand”) apologize on behalf of the people and promise to give them a swift kick up the backside. He said that someone had told the village that the Americans were coming to look through your houses (a particularly touchy subject with the Afghans – you would bring dishonor to them, see their women, etc.) and do all sorts of bad things. The enemy had very cleverly engaged in disinformation. If we had not kept our cool, or someone had as much as thrown a rock – the effort would have probably yielded great results for the enemy. Forget LT Calley and My Lai, it would have been MAJ Swiss and Qarabaghi Robat.
So the lesson for those that would engage in counterinsurgency (or policing, hint hint), you must be prepared to sometimes just stop looking around and leave people alone. Then find out what is going on, if you do need to go back for a good reason (we did not). For police, I think, the hassling, the stop and frisk, and searches of homes that more resemble a ransacking would have a similar bad effect. The people of the community you are policing would then be confirmed in their belief you don’t care, you are just there to push them around. They will be sullen, uncooperative, or hostile.
Better to just come back if everyone is riled up at you – and there is no threat to life or property. I wasn’t about to shoot up a village to inspect a garbage pit, and the police should not trash homes or violate people’s bodily integrity just trying to find their own garbage dump.
Once I finished laughing at myself (I was thinking of the look on my face) I said “This is important. Did he say ‘some mines” or ‘some more mines’?” The interpreter turned to the farmer and then yelled up to me “He said some more mines. But you should be OK, if you stay on the path.”
The “path” was not as wide as my size 12 boots. Putting aside the thought “this would be a really stupid way to die”, I managed to make the last 35 meters or so up the cliff-side. Why did the farmer warn me? Because some tidewater Virginians had towed an old Soviet tractor that had gotten stuck in his village.
They see me rollin’, they hatin’, patrolling
Late 2004, I was the CJTF Eagle Civil Affairs Officer, and I was with a squad of Virginia Army National Guard as they visited Ashrafkhel, in Parwan Province, Afghanistan. One of the men in the village pointed out the small cliffs near the Panjshir River and said that some suspicious people had been up there a couple of nights ago. Half the squad swarmed up the two paths nearest where the man had pointed. Thinking I was clever, I took a path over to the north of where everyone else was going up, to keep an eye on things. Halfway up, I heard the interpreter yell up to me “He says the weather may have uncovered some (unintelligible) mines.”
So I was able to avoid stomping on old Taliban or Northern Alliance mines, join the Virginians and find evidence that someone had been tinkering with things that go boom.
Well, lookie here. Somebody done been naughty.
Why did these people help us? When we rolled in to town, they looked like most of the people in the area. Thinking things like “Now what?” “These guys, again?” “Oh boy, the circus is in town!” The squad leader asked the first man we spoke to “how is the tractor doing?” The man’s face lit up and he said something to the effect of “Oh, it is you guys! The ones who helped us!” The month before, this same squad had rolled through and used their HMMWVs to pull the village’s only tractor (an old Soviet model) out of a ditch. No doors kicked in, no searches, no swaggering around acting tough and such. Just some farm boys helping out other farmers. We had a nice chat about how the old tractor was now kaputt, but they were hoping to get a new one soon. That was the point when someone joined us and mentioned where the naughty folks had been hanging out.
Some number of hours later, when my sphincter had finally unclenched, I reported everything to the Ops Officer. I even had the insight to mention how this was a nice contrast to the company of Airborne guys that had caused quite a stir booting in doors and barging through houses in a village to the north, a while back. But it took reading various police misconduct stories to make the connection here at home.
Gaining trust, when you are seen as (or actually are) outsiders, armed and seemingly unaccountable to anyone, can be difficult. It takes restraint. When faced with intransigent, maybe even sullen and uncooperative people, it can be very be very difficult to not get impatient and resort to “tell me what I want to know/comply/obey!” It also takes time. If you roll up and say “trust me”, most people are going to reflexively go on guard.
The good will many police departments had years back, was earned over a long time. It probably arose, in part, from having the same beat cops around. They got to know you, and you got to see they were not just interested in hassling you, writing citations or getting in a bust right at the end of a shift for some sweet overtime.
To rebuild the trust lost by many departments (primarily during the Drug War) from property grabbing to door busting to stop and frisk, it will take restraint and time. We need cops who help a drunk get home from the bus stop or train station, call for a wrecker for a broken down car and waits until it shows up, stop in and talk to store owners, bar tenders and other people in the neighborhood and then amiably go on their way. Rather than act like an occupying army, pull a tractor out of a ditch.
In 2004-2005 I was part of the long and latest version of the wars in Afghanistan. I was the Civil Affairs Officer for one of the two Task Forces running around Parwan, Kapisa and part of Kabul province. My job – Go make nice with the locals, and keep your ears and eyes open.
“Daddy will be back to help in a minute”“I thought the Marines did Toys for Tots, dang it!”
At the time, the Taliban was trying to reconstitute itself and come back into the country from Pakistan. A few of them managed to straggle in, without being vaporized by A-10s or such. Where I was, the asshats were primarily the HIG. Our local friends were all former Northern Alliance members.
The fellow on the left is Haji Almos – he was a commander of one of the Northern Alliance “corps” and a man rumored to have gained his wealth through opium and other smuggling operations. He “went legit” by running for office in the Wolesi Jirga (Parliament). During a meeting, he informed those in attendance that an endorsement from a particular American military officer in the area would carry great weight, and if he got it…well, we would have a friend in the Wolesi Jirga. (I was only slightly startled, being from the Chicagoland area.) I did ask that officer if, when he was at West Point, he was ever told he would be asked to be a Kingmaker in a far off land? That got me a chuckle and a shake of the head. We politely demurred and wished him luck, nonetheless. He won office that Fall. Here was a man that had basically fought on our side, offered political support…but it was, I think, because the wind was blowing our way. His actions after taking office were not all that nice. For what it is worth, he is not in office anymore.
The man on the right is Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili. He is dead. While still alive, he was appointed provincial police chief of the province I lived in. He cleaned out the Taliban and HIG, and was asked to take an even more dangerous assignment. The Taliban killed him by suicide bomber attack. Before we got there in 2001, he had personally aided hundreds of people fleeing the Taliban, fought those same Taliban and welcomed us. He closely cooperated with NATO all the way up to his death.
The man on the left, front is Kabir Ahmad. He was the government head of the district (roughly equivalent to an American County) I lived in. He had also been part of the fight against the Taliban, but moreso keeping things on the administrative side. He found out I was a lawyer back in America, and we hit it off (he was an attorney as well as administrator). Whenever something broke bad, he would be rushing to the scene with the district police (his office was kind of a County Chairman, Sheriff and District Attorney all rolled into one). He received death threats on a regular basis from the HIG, Taliban and anyone else who resented his fairly honest and efficient work. He was a tireless advocate for help improving the area I was working – anyone or anything he could wrangle to dig a well, build an agriculture cooperative building or the like. He was a brave man, a good man.
So what, if anything did we owe them? By “we,” I mean the taxpayers and military members of the countries involved in Afghanistan (primarily the US, but the UK, Canada and others had expended a considerable effort). The US led forces had come in to bash the Taliban over the head and get the AQ folks who had set up the 9/11/2001 attacks on the US. The Northern Alliance used our air support to push the Taliban back
“Here, and no further, went the Taliban”
and some of our own forces helped finish the job. Once the head bashing was done, we stuck around, dumped in more forces, and started doing mostly occupation and rebuilding things. Did we owe anything to the Afghans that had been on our side? They fought our enemies, helped us as much as they could…some of it out of self-interest (survival, primarily), some of it out of a sense of honor, and some out of an opportunity to use us to their own ends (both good and selfishly bad).
As a soldier, I felt a debt to them. These were allies and fellow combatants – they had been killing Taliban before any of us had even heard the name. But as a budding libertarian, I felt that we were sort of hanging around when it was not so much our job any more. Why was I, a 20 year Soldier, digging wells, building schools and trying not to get blowed up real good while doing so? Was I supporting and defending the Constitution of the United States from all enemies, foreign or domestic? This is what NATO was for?
So my question to all of you, is when is the debt paid? Was there a debt to begin with? Do we owe anything to the people that risk (and sometimes lose) their lives working on behalf of our government’s stated goals?
I struggle with it, partially because part of my heart is still in the Panjshir Valley, with Kabir Ahmad, and with the Sayedkhili family. But as a libertarian, I know that if you kick in the door and get the SOB inside the house– once you fix the door back up, or give the homeowner enough to fix it themselves…it is time to leave.
Update: Yes, I once did narrow my gaze at the entirety of Northeast Afghanistan
“Don’t think I missed any of that Parwan, Kapisa, Kabul or Panjshir…you too Badakhshan.
